1. Introduction
===============

Seasonal influenza epidemics affect the health of population in many countries. The elderly is more vulnerable to the disease among them, which sometimes results in hospitalisation or death [@bib1]. One way of countering this public health issue is to implement vaccination programme targeting the elderly [@bib2], since influenza vaccine is considered as effective not only in preventing contraction of the disease [@bib3], but also reducing risk of death after contraction [@bib4]. Although some recent studies cast doubts as to the latter effectiveness, i.e., reducing mortality [@bib5], [@bib6], [@bib7], a number of countries or regions organise such vaccination programmes [@bib8]. In Japan, national government has set up a nationwide influenza vaccination programme for people aged 65 and over since 2001/2002 season.

These programmes usually employ several measures such as public relations or health education in order to encourage the elderly to receive shots. Subsidy is also provided [@bib8], since reducing the price of a shot is believed to increase the uptake of vaccination. However, the response of the elderly as a consumer in regard to price changes, i.e., price elasticity of demand, has not been well studied. Theoretically, knowledge of price elasticity is of great help to design an efficient subsidy programme including vaccination programmes [@bib9], but a few are reported in the literature. A correlation between subsidy levels and uptake rates is found in multinational comparison incorporating 18 developed countries [@bib10]; a rise in uptake rate that is resulted from Medicare coverage in the U.S. [@bib11]; the removal of fee increases uptake rate in an intervention study in Denmark [@bib12]; price elasticity of demand, −0.022, is estimated by conjoint analysis before the launch of the national programme in Japan [@bib13].

This lack of knowledge is probably due to the fact that such programmes usually set fixed price for all target population, which make it difficult to observe the consumer\'s response to price change. The current Japanese programme, however, obligates municipal authorities to manage vaccination for their aged inhabitants, and the decision of co-payment and subsidy level, that is, the price of a shot to a consumer, is devolved to municipal authorities. This arrangement makes the area of each municipality a market for flu shots, and it is possible to observe pairs of various prices and uptake rates. There is a study which reports price elasticity of −0.26 during 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 season by a survey covering 13 big cities [@bib14]. We also take advantage of this "natural experiment", and aim to estimate price elasticity of demand for influenza vaccination among the elderly with national representative samples. The results of this study should be useful in managing vaccination programmes through price setting, and deepen the understanding of consumer behaviour toward preventive services.

2. Materials and methods
========================

In Japan, due to the decentralised implementation of vaccination programme, price and subsidy by each municipality is not monitored or surveyed, while uptake rate by the municipality is published yearly by the central government [@bib15]. We conducted a nationwide sample survey on price, subsidy, and uptake rate of vaccination in order to illustrate the trend of national averages, of which results were published elsewhere [@bib16]. In this survey, operational 300 samples were randomly selected using a list of 22,671,944 people aged 65 and over inhabiting all 3252 municipalities during 2002/2003 season as a sampling frame. A questionnaire inquiring price charged to a recipient, subsidy provided by the municipality, the number of target population, and the number of vaccinated from 2001/2002 to 2004/2005 season was sent to each municipal authorities where operational samples inhabited. The use of the combination of individual level sampling frame and municipality level survey is chosen, since large-scale mergers of municipalities underwent in these years as a local government reform. 196 authorities out of 210 replied, which gave response rate of 94.0% at sample level.

In this study, we assume the operational samples of this survey as an operational panel, in which each sample faces various prices of flu shot for four times between 2001/2002 and 2004/2005 season, since the level of subsidy is usually set by a yearly negotiation between local authority and local medical association. We use uptake rates as a measure of demand assuming them as the probability of an operational sample to receive a shot.

In the literature, non-cash price such as travel cost or time cost has been proven to be significant in the demand for health care [@bib17], including flu shots [@bib18]. Since shots are usually provided at almost all local hospitals and clinics under cooperation with their municipal authority, we calculate the number of hospitals and clinics divided by the area of municipality to gain density of shot location as a variable of non-cash price surrogating travel cost using System of Social and Demographic Statistics (SSDS) by Statistics Bureau [@bib19]. We added this variable to our operational panel data.

Income or budget constraint is also significant in the demand at individual level [@bib20]. However, it is not possible to define any variable of income for our operational sample that can be combined with our operational panel data, because we construct our operational sample not through an actual observation of individuals but through an interpretation of market level observation. Average income of people aged 65 and over by the municipality is not available in SSDS, but average income per capita is available. We add this variable to our operational panel data as a controlling variable considering it as an activity level of local economy, although we do not speculate any systematic effect on the demand.

Some factors such as influenza morbidity or mortality in the previous season or current season are found influential on the demand for influenza vaccination [@bib18], [@bib21]. In this study, however, we do not incorporate any variable that represent such factors. We also leave the level of public relations or health education untreated due to lack of data. Instead, we leave these as unobserved and intend to control their effect on the demand using panel estimation [@bib22], [@bib23], [@bib24].

We specified four equations in order to estimate price elasticity as below:$$\text{ln}\, r_{i} = \alpha + \beta_{1}\text{ln}\, p_{i} + \beta_{2}\text{ln}\, d_{i} + \beta_{3}\text{ln}\, y_{i} + \varepsilon_{t},\quad i = 1,\ldots,N\,(\text{season}\,\text{model})$$where *r* is uptake rate, *p* is price of a shot, *d* is density of shot location, *y* is income per capita, *ɛ* is error term, *i* represents each sample in a season, and *N* is number of samples in a season. Uptake rate, price of a shot, and density of shot location are converted into logarithm so that we can interpret coefficient *β* ~1~ and *β* ~2~ as elasticity [@bib25]. Income is also converted into logarithm, since unit of measurement, yen, is the same as price, while we do not interpret *β* ~3~ as income elasticity. According to this equation, season models from 2001/2002 to 2004/2005 season are estimated$$\text{ln}\, r_{i} = \alpha + \beta_{1}\text{ln}\frac{p_{i}}{c_{t}} + \beta_{2}\text{ln}\, d_{i} + \beta_{3}\text{ln}\frac{y_{i}}{c_{t}} + \varepsilon_{i},\quad i = 1,\ldots,M,\, t = 1,\ldots,T\,(\text{pool}\,\text{model})$$where *c* is consumer price index, *t* represents observed season, *M* represents each sample in the panel regardless of the observed season, and *T* is number of observed seasons. Consumer price index is incorporated for the purpose of controlling the effect of inflation over the season. With this equation, we estimate pool models$$\text{ln}\, r_{it} = \alpha + \beta_{1}\text{ln}\frac{p_{it}}{c_{t}} + \beta_{2}\text{ln}\, d_{it} + \beta_{3}\text{ln}\frac{y_{it}}{c_{t}} + v_{it},\quad i = 1,\ldots,N,\, t = 1,\ldots,T\,(\text{panel}\,\text{random}\,\text{effect}\,\text{model})$$where $v_{it}$ represents disturbance. This equation is for panel estimation of random effect model.$$\text{ln}\, r_{it} = \alpha + \alpha_{i} + \beta_{1}\text{ln}\frac{p_{it}}{c_{t}} + \beta_{2}\text{ln}\, d_{it} + \beta_{3}\text{ln}\frac{y_{it}}{c_{t}} + u_{it},\quad i = 1,\ldots,N,\, t = 1,\ldots,T\,(\text{panel}\,\text{fixed}\,\text{effect}\,\text{model})$$where *α* ~*i*~ represents fixed effect regarding *i*th sample, and *u* ~*it*~ represents reminder disturbance. This equation is for panel estimation of fixed effect model.

With [(3)](#eq3){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(4)](#eq4){ref-type="disp-formula"}, we estimate two panel models, which are compared with pool model and each other with diagnostic tests such as Hausman test of misspecification.

A previous study [@bib14] reports price elasticity in 13 big cities, and there are some that reports the difference in utilisation of preventive services, for example, mass health examination [@bib26], and cancer screening programme [@bib27], between urban and rural inhabitants in Japan. Inhabitants of rural area tend to use more preventive service voluntarily compared to urban inhabitants. Taking these studies into account, in addition to estimating national models using all operational samples, urban models using only samples that live in cities, and rural models using only samples that live in towns or villages are also estimated. Because of our sampling design, both models can be interpreted as representative of each area in Japan.

Statistical package software STATA 9 is used for computation.

3. Results
==========

[Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} shows summary statistics of variables. National average of uptake rate, the demand, increased remarkably from 29.9% in 2001/2002 season to 49.6% in 2004/2005 season, which resulted in 41.1% over all seasons. Similar increases are also observed in urban area and rural area, while higher rates are observed in rural area than in urban area. It should be noted that the observed period is the beginning of the programme, during which there is supposed to bring about the broad diffusion of vaccination [@bib28]. Additionally, outbreaks such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002/2003 season and avian flu in 2002/2003 season occurred, and a word, "influenza", was heavily publicised during these seasons. The need of preparation for the emergence of pandemic influenza virus was also emphasised by the government in the following years. Such information may have affect on consumers' behaviour. National average of price in all seasons is ¥1134 (US\$9.86: US\$1 = ¥115). The lowest price is ¥0 (US\$0), and the highest ¥2500 (US\$21.74). A shot is slightly more expensive in rural area than in urban area. National average of density of shot location, the non-cash price, is 2.0 per km^2^, and it ranges from 0.0023 per km^2^ to 20 per km^2^. Urban average is smaller than rural as anticipated. National average of income, the activity level of local economy, is ¥3,439,000 (US\$29,900), and it ranges from ¥2,407,000 (US\$20,900) to ¥4,970,000 (US\$43,200). Urban average is larger than rural as anticipated. National average of subsidy is ¥2962 (US\$25.76), and it ranges from ¥0 (US\$0) to ¥4599 (US\$39.99), while national average of subsidy level 72.1%, from 0% to 100%. Urban municipal authorities tend to expend more subsidy than rural authorities.Table 1Summary statistics.2001/20022002/20032003/20042004/2005PoolNational Uptake rate[a](#tbl1fn1){ref-type="table-fn"}  Obs2572772812791094  Mean0.29880.37790.46110.49600.4108  Std. Dev.0.094610.086580.083600.079130.1146   Price (Yen)  Obs2522612642631040  Mean11341135113811281134  Std. Dev.449.0419.0399.4384.1412.6   Density of shot location[b](#tbl1fn2){ref-type="table-fn"} (km^2^)  Obs2822822822821128  Mean1.9952.0212.0412.0662.031  Std. Dev.3.1133.1453.1783.2203.160   Income (10^3^ Yen)  Obs2822822822821128  Mean35083478340533673439  Std. Dev.491.6486.4456.5458.1476.1   Subsidy (Yen)  Obs2682782752811102  Mean29722955296629542962  Std. Dev.883.0806.6752.5747.5784.3   Subsidy level[c](#tbl1fn3){ref-type="table-fn"} (%)  Obs2492602592631031  Mean72.271.872.172.272.1  Std. Dev.12.012.210.710.511.4  Urban Uptake rate  Obs203217218216854  Mean0.29170.36920.45460.48830.4027  Std. Dev.0.090320.077920.077000.069630.1094   Price (Yen)  Obs206211211210838  Mean11191120113111201122  Std. Dev.464.8430.6399.0385.9420.2   Density of shot location (km^2^)  Obs218218218218872  Mean2.5032.5362.5642.5952.546  Std. Dev.3.3663.3993.4353.4803.415   Income (10^3^ Yen)  Obs218218218218872  Mean36273597351434783554  Std. Dev.477.8456. 1428.3429.6446.7   Subsidy (Yen)  Obs212217213218860  Mean30743049306530433057  Std. Dev.765.5753.8683.7686.7722.1   Subsidy level (%)  Obs207214211213845  Mean73.272.773.173.173.0  Std. Dev.11.011.39.29.210.2  Rural Uptake rate  Obs54606363240  Mean0.32580.40930.48360.52250.4397  Std. Dev.0.10590.10750.10080.10170.1270   Price (Yen)  Obs46505353202  Mean12011199116911691183  Std. Dev.366.4362.9403.4378.1376.2   Density of shot location (km^2^)  Obs64646464256  Mean0.26490.26880.25870.26070.2633  Std. Dev.0.52840.53440.47620.47790.5020   Income (10^3^ Yen)  Obs64646464256  Mean31043074303229883050  Std. Dev.372.8352.7339.4334.6350.9   Subsidy (Yen)  Obs56616263242  Mean28582622262326482621  Std. Dev.963.4902.2875.4866.3895.5   Subsidy level (%)  Obs42464850186  Mean67.367.467.668.567.7  Std. Dev.15.515.214.914.514.9[^1][^2][^3]

[Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"} shows the results of OLS estimation of Eq. [(1)](#eq1){ref-type="disp-formula"}, season models. The demand for influenza vaccination depends significantly on price and non-cash price in the majority of models with the exception of rural 2003/2004 model and rural 2004/2005 model. Price elasticity is estimated as −0.0441 to −0.0187 in national model, −0.0384 to −0.00323 in urban model, and −0.109 to −0.0152 in rural model, of which negative signs are anticipated. Negative non-cash price elasticity is found in most of the models, which is also anticipated. Activity level of local economy is not significant as a determinant of the demand in all models.Table 2OLS estimation of Eq. [(1)](#eq1){ref-type="disp-formula"}.National 2001/2002 modelNational 2002/2003 modelNational 2003/2004 modelNational 2004/2005 modelCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-Statisticsln(price + 1)−0.0437−2.93[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0441−4.13[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0187−1.58−0.0358−2.65[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}ln(density)−0.0413−1.98[\*](#tbl2fn1){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0442−3.59[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0321−3.07[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0252−2.86[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}ln(income)−0.0953−0.38−0.07343−0.500.06110.470.003100.03Constant−0.201−0.10−0.117−0.10−1.18−1.11−0.503−0.57Prob \> *F*(3,234) = 0.0005Prob \> *F*(3,254) = 0.0000Prob \> *F*(3,259) = 0.0001Prob \> *F*(3,256) = 0.0000Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0606Adj *R*^2^ = 0.1613Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0665Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0931Urban 2001/2002 modelUrban 2002/2003 modelUrban 2003/2004 modelUrban 2004/2005 modelCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-Statisticsln(price + 1)−0.0384−2.44[\*](#tbl2fn1){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.00323−3.03[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0186−1.27−0.00920−0.58ln(density)−0.0956−3.19[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0773−4.62[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0543−3.82[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0527−4.47[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}ln(income)0.1450.50−0.0257−0.160.05330.380.06470.56constant−2.20−0.92−0.569−0.43−1.10−0.94−1.18−1.25Prob \> *F*(3,192) = 0.0001Prob \> *F*(3,206) = 0.0000Prob \> *F*(3,207) = 0.0000Prob \> *F*(3,207) = 0.0000Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0867Adj *R*^2^ = 0.2159Adj *R*^2^ = 0.1279Adj *R*^2^ = 0.1617Rural 2001/2002 modelRural 2002/2003 modelRural 2003/2004 modelRural 2004/2005 modelCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-StatisticsCoefficient*t*-Statisticsln(price + 1)−0.0985−2.44[\*](#tbl2fn1){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.109−3.47[\*\*](#tbl2fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0152−0.69−0.0509−1.88ln(density)0.05601.61−0.0223−0.87−0.0239−1.000.002540.12ln(income)−0.254−0.560.3450.970.5331.600.2450.85Constant1.670.44−3.01−1.03−5.00−1.85−2.28−0.96Prob \> *F*(3,38) = 0.0434Prob \> *F*(3,44) = 0.0057Prob \> *F*(3,48) = 0.3864Prob \> *F*(3,48) = 0.1599Adj *R*^2^ = 0.1266Adj *R*^2^ = 0.1949Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0019Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0449[^4][^5]

[Table 3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"} shows the results of OLS estimation of Eq. [(2)](#eq2){ref-type="disp-formula"}, pool models. The demand depends significantly on price in national model and rural model. Price elasticity is estimated as −0.0236 in national model, −0.0113 in urban model, and −0.0626 in rural model. These values are within the range estimated in season models. Non-cash price becomes insignificant in national model and rural model. Non-cash price elasticity in rural model lessens its size and goes beyond zero, which contradicts the anticipation. With negative coefficient, activity level of local economy becomes significant as a determinant of the demand in national model and urban model.Table 3OLS estimation of Eq. [(2)](#eq2){ref-type="disp-formula"}.Coefficient*t*-StatisticsNational pool model ln((price + 1)/cpi)−0.0236−2.69[\*\*](#tbl3fn2){ref-type="table-fn"} ln(density)−0.0136−1.48 ln(income/cpi)−0.393−3.55[\*\*](#tbl3fn2){ref-type="table-fn"} Constant2.422.66[\*\*](#tbl3fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}Prob \> *F*(3,1015) = 0.0000Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0524  Urban pool model ln((price + 1)/cpi)−0.0113−1.15 ln(density)−0.0329−2.44[\*](#tbl3fn1){ref-type="table-fn"} ln(income/cpi)−0.398−3.01[\*\*](#tbl3fn2){ref-type="table-fn"} Constant2.362.19[\*](#tbl3fn1){ref-type="table-fn"}Prob \> *F*(3,821) = 0.0000Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0600  Rural pool model ln((price + 1)/cpi)−0.0626−3.34[\*\*](#tbl3fn2){ref-type="table-fn"} ln(density)0.008080.48 ln(income/cpi)0.01760.08 Constant−0.573−0.31Prob \> *F*(3,190) = 0.0088Adj *R*^2^ = 0.0443[^6][^7][^8]

[Table 4](#tbl4){ref-type="table"} shows the results of panel estimation of Eqs. [(3)](#eq3){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(4)](#eq4){ref-type="disp-formula"}, random effect models and fixed effect models. Random effect models are selected over pool models by Breusch and Pagan Lagrangizan Multiplier tests, which reject null hypothesis that the variance of individual effect is zero. The demand depends significantly on price in rural model. Negative price elasticity is estimated as −0.00581 in national model, and −0.0537 in rural model, while positive price elasticity is estimated as 0.0248 in urban model, which is similar to pool models. Non-cash price elasticity becomes positive without significance in all models. With negative coefficient, activity level of local economy is significant as a determinant of the demand in national model and urban model, which is the same as pool models.Table 4Panel estimation of Eqs. (3) and (4).National random effect modelNational fixed effect modelCoefficient*t*-Statistics95% Conf. intervalCoefficient*z*-Statistics95% Conf. intervalln((price + 1)/cpi)−0.00581−0.57−0.02568 to 0.01400.002210.18−0.0221 to 0.0265ln(density)0.02051.61−0.00155 to 0.4560.5983.38[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}0.251 to 0.945ln(income/cpi)−0.906−5.95[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−1.20 to −0.607−7.46−17.7[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−8.29 to −6.63Constant6.495.19[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}4.04 to 8.9460.117.4[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}53.3 to 66.8Number of observation = 1019, number of groups = 266Prob \> Wald*χ*^2^(3) = 0.0000, *R*^2^(within) = 0.3061Prob \> *F*(3,750) = 0.0000, *R*^2^(within) = 0.3268*R*^2^(between) = 0.0.0454, *R*^2^(overall) = 0.0416*R*^2^(between) = 0.0.0038, *R*^2^(overall) = 0.0015*F*-test (pool model vs. fixed effect model): *F*(265,750) = 4.06, Prob \> *F* = 0.0000Breusch and Pagan Lagrangizan Multiplier test for random effects: *χ*^2^(1) = 52.94, Prob \> *χ*^2^ = 0.0000Hausman specification test: *χ*^2^(3) = 352.95, Prob \> *χ*^2^ = 0.0000Urban random effect modelUrban fixed effect modelCoefficient*z*-Statistics95% Conf. intervalCoefficient*z*-Statistics95% Conf. intervalln((price + 1)/cpi)0.002480.23−0.0190 to 0.02400.003230.26−0.0211 to 0.0275ln(density)0.01120.62−0.0245 to 0.04701.184.59[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}0.676 to 1.69ln(income/cpi)−0.936−5.36[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−1.28 to −0.594−7.31−15.3[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−8.25 to −6.37Constant6.694.67[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}3.88 to 9.5058.514.8[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}50.7 to 66.3Number of observation = 825, number of groups = 211Prob \> Wald*χ*^2^(3) = 0.0000, *R*^2^(within) = 0.3330Prob \> *F*(3,611) = 0.0000, *R*^2^(within) = 0.3543*R*^2^(between) = 0.0149, *R*^2^(overall) = 0.0397*R*^2^(between) = 0.0960, *R*^2^(overall) = 0.0157*F*-test (pool model vs. fixed effect model): *F*(210,611) = 4.09, Prob \> *F* = 0.0000Breusch and Pagan Lagrangizan Multiplier test for random effects: *χ*^2^(1) = 31.20, Prob \> *χ*^2^ = 0.0000Hausman specification test: *χ*^2^(3) = 336.67, Prob \> *χ*^2^ = 0.0000Rural random effect modelRural fixed effect modelCoefficient*z*-Statistics95% Conf. intervalCoefficient*z*-Statistics95% Conf. intervalln((price + 1)/cpi)−0.0537−1.99[\*](#tbl4fn1){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.107 to −0.000736−1.07−3.24[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−1.72 to −0.416ln(density)0.02661.02−0.0248 to 0.0780−0.0521−0.22−0.519 to 0.415ln(income/cpi)−0.422−1.23−1.09 to 0.251−6.10−6.36[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}−7.99 to −4.20Constant2.941.05−2.57 to 8.4455.57.15[\*\*](#tbl4fn2){ref-type="table-fn"}40.1 to 70.8Number of observation = 194, number of groups = 55Prob \> Wald*χ*^2^(3) = 0.1406, *R*^2^(within) = 0.2784Prob \> *F*(3,136) = 0.0000, *R*^2^(within) = 0.2987*R*^2^(between) = 0.0.0454, *R*^2^(overall) = 0.0416*R*^2^(between) = 0.0109, *R*^2^(overall) = 0.0340*F*-test (pool model vs. fixed effect model): *F*(54,136) = 4.17, Prob \> *F* = 0.0000Breusch and Pagan Lagrangizan Multiplier test for random effects: *χ*^2^(1) = 13.30, Prob \> *χ*^2^ = 0.0003Hausman specification test: *χ*^2^(3) = 57.08, Prob \> *χ*^2^ = 0.0000[^9][^10][^11]

Fixed effect models are selected over pool model by *F*-tests, which rejects null hypothesis that individual effects are constant among all individual samples, and over random effect models by Hausman tests, which rejects null hypothesis that the variance of individual effect is zero. The demand depends significantly on price in rural model, of which elasticity inflates up to −1.07. Price elasticity becomes positive, 0.00221 in national model, as well as 0.00323 in urban model, which are nearly zero. Positive and relatively large non-cash elasticity is estimated with significance in national model and rural model, while negative and insignificant in rural model. The former results contradict our anticipation. With negative coefficient, activity level of local economy is significant as a determinant of the demand in all models.

4. Discussion
=============

We estimate price elasticity of demand for influenza vaccine among the elderly in Japan with national representative panel data: nearly zero in nationwide, nearly zero in urban area, and −1.07 in rural area. The selection of fixed effect models among models estimated by diagnostic tests is not unexpected, when the rise in uptake rates through a process of diffusion and relative invariability of variables such as price, density of shot location, and average income per capita, are taken into account. The estimators in fixed effect models should be most statistically efficient among those models, and the figures of price elasticity can be considered as estimators after controlling not only observed factors but also unobserved ones.

The almost totally price inelastic result at national level is probably due to the contribution by urban samples, of which number is much larger than rural. Price elasticity of nearly zero in urban area is surprising, which contrasts with the previously reported relatively elastic −0.26 in 13 big cities in 2001/2002 season and 2002/2003 season [@bib14]. Even if we limit by the season for the sake of comparison, our results, −0.00323 to −0.0384 is obviously less elastic. Perhaps this difference is explained by the difference in 'urban area' surveyed. In our survey, only 14.5% of urban samples inhabit the 13 big cities surveyed by the previous study.

Highly elastic result in rural area may be explained by a lower income of the elderly compared to those of urban area, which is suggested by our observation of the activity level of local economy. An opportunity cost of the difference in price around ¥1183 (US\$10.29) may be higher in rural area. A previous study on participation in cancer screening in Japan [@bib27] discussed that a small fee, arguably similar to the price in this study, seemed to have nothing to do with higher participation rate observed in rural communities, and ignored price as a determinant of participation in their analysis. Our results, however, implies that subsidy that reduce price to a consumer might be effective in such situation.

The unanticipated positive non-cash price elasticity in urban fixed effect model is not so surprising, since it is not difficult to imagine the easy geographical access in concentrated urban area that a consumer may not pay much attention to travel cost when seeking health care. Positive non-cash elasticity at national level is probably due to the contribution by the large number of urban samples, as well.

The sampling method used in the survey data of this study, simple random selection using individual level sampling frame, is chosen for the purpose of studying the expected level of price faced by an 'average' aged person, overcoming concurrent municipality mergers. Simple random selection at an individual level is rarely used in nationwide surveys, while the combination of selection using list of municipality as a frame and estimation with population weights is more frequently used mainly because of practicality [@bib16], [@bib29], [@bib30]. Our approach, however, does not accompany any bias, and it is therefore methodologically rigorous as the other approach.

The results of this study question the rationale for subsidy in influenza vaccination programme targeting the elderly. The elderly is not sensitive to price change especially in urban area, which means that reducing the price does not encourage them more to receive a shot. A benefit-cost analysis of current Japanese programme speculates potential benefit gain obtainable from increasing subsidy based on the estimation of price elastic demand in big cities [@bib14]. But given the price inelastic results of this study, it is not recommendable to hastily raise the subsidy level at least in urban area. Since we demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of current programme with average subsidy level of 71%, of which results unchanged even when the effectiveness of reducing mortality is assumed negligible, elsewhere [@bib31], more effort on public relations or health education without the increase of subsidy level may be a preferred policy in urban area. There may be some potential benefit gain by increasing subsidy in rural area.

5. Conclusions
==============

Our finding shows that demand for influenza vaccination among the elderly can vary from elastic to inelastic depending on the characteristics of locality, and there are cases where subsidy cannot be effective. This addresses implications for developed countries where similar vaccination programmes are implemented. There are cases that maintaining or increasing level of subsidy is not an efficient use of finite health care resources. When organising a vaccination programme, managers should be careful about the balance between subsidy and other efforts, by taking the characteristics of the locality into account and with price elasticity of demand in mind. Further studies looking at income elasticity of demand or the effect of other efforts to encourage people to receive a shot, which this study does not model directly, are awaited.
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[^1]: Ratio of the number of vaccinated to the target population during the season.

[^2]: The number of clinics and hospitals per km^2^.

[^3]: Proportion of subsidy in the sum of price and subsidy.

[^4]: *p* \< 0.05.

[^5]: *p* \< 0.001.

[^6]: cpi: Consumer Price Index.

[^7]: *p* \< 0.05.

[^8]: *p* \< 0.001.

[^9]: cpi: Consumer Price Index.

[^10]: *p* \< 0.05.

[^11]: *p* \< 0.001.
